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mistaken inferences about the use of merger efficiencies made in 
Jamie Henikoff Moffitt’s Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency 
Analysis.1 Specifically, this Response provides context to her article by 
discussing the actual practice of merger efficiencies and the 
underlying scholarly work in the area. 
Moffitt’s article is interesting and novel. Indeed, it is the first 
antitrust article to apply the insights of negotiation theory to the 
merger process. However, Moffitt’s analysis could have benefited from 
a more thorough discussion of the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission’s (collectively, the “agencies”) analysis of 
efficiencies during investigations and the broader process of 
negotiations involving mergers. For instance, the article does not 
discuss the empirical work addressing when the agencies use 
efficiencies, the role antitrust practitioners play during the merger 
process in shaping whether or not the agencies will litigate a case, or 
the types of issues that end in litigation. Moreover, the article does not 
sufficiently analyze merger enforcement decisions at the agencies 
based on the efficiencies section of the 1997 Revisions to the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1997 Revisions”) and the new 2010 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (“2010 Merger Guidelines”).2 Moffitt also overlooks 
the importance of the 2006 Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (“Commentary”) and fails to address the chapter within the 
Commentary that specifically addresses how the agencies consider 
efficiencies.3 Lastly, Moffitt’s claims stressing the importance of her 
work in a broader context of business issues (such as the financial 
crisis) and policy debates regarding shifts in antitrust merger 
enforcement are without empirical support.4 This Response addresses 
each of these issues in turn. 
1. 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697 (2010).
2. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Merger 
Guidelines]; U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 
(1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter 1997 
Revisions]; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines]. The only change between the 1997 Revisions and 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines was Section 4 on efficiencies.  
3. Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, ch. 4, 49–59 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247 
.pdf [hereinafter Commentary]. The specific chapter that Moffitt omits is titled “Efficiencies.” 
4. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1724–27.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800420
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I. THE NEED FOR A BROAD UNIVERSE IN EXAMINING 
MERGER EFFICIENCIES 
The title of Moffitt’s work suggests that Moffitt has examined 
the universe of behavior beyond decided cases to also include those 
cases decided in the “shadow of the law.”5 Instead, Moffitt excludes all 
but preliminary injunction cases.6 This approach is unfortunate 
because the preliminary injunction cases are not necessarily 
representative of how the agencies evaluate efficiencies on a case-by-
case basis. By failing to include an analysis of all cases truly decided 
in the shadow of the law, Moffitt’s work leads to a combination of 
mistaken and overly broad inferences. 
Because Moffitt’s article only examines preliminary injunction 
cases, it is not clear what inferences apply to the larger body of merger 
cases. The Priest-Klein theory suggests that in looking at a narrow 
subset, as Moffitt does by focusing solely on litigated disputes, her 
analysis is neither representative nor random.7 Indeed, most “action” 
in mergers generally and in merger efficiencies specifically occurs in 
dynamics between the agencies and outside counsel (including 
economists employed by outside counsel) in various stages of the 
merger notification process.8 Yet the author did not analyze or 
evaluate the important discussions between the potential merging 
parties and agency staff that occur during the initial waiting period 
(thirty days in most cases). She also did not analyze or evaluate the 
dynamics in the subsequent second request period that occur before 
the Assistant Attorney General or the FTC decides to either seek some 
type of enforcement action or close an investigation. By ignoring how 
merger efficiencies affect these discussions, Moffitt misses an 
opportunity to provide more accurate insight. Thus, the litigated cases 
are not representative of the broader universe of matters involving 
merger efficiencies. 
When firms contemplating mergers consider litigated cases as 
part of the decisionmaking process, they must consider them in 
context. The agencies provide a yearly breakdown of statistics showing 
5. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). Mnookin and Kornhauser coined this now famous term 
to describe how legal rules influence parties to a dispute during the settlement process, which 
accounts for most case outcomes. 
6. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1747–54.
7. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984). 
8. D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1055, 1100–02 (2010). 
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the number of merger cases they investigate each fiscal year.9 Given 
the change in merger activity due to the Great Recession, Table 1 
below provides the total number of mergers filed over the past six-year 
period to illustrate how Moffitt’s focus excludes a large part of the 
dynamics of the merger process. We include statistics only for those 
cases notified under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (“HSR”).10 
 














 50  45  63 41  31  46 
 
 From 2005 to 2010, the agencies received a combined 1,675, 
1,768, 2,201, 1,726, 716, and 1,166 HSR notifications, respectively. A 
smaller subset of these investigations involved a second request (an 
investigation beyond the thirty-day (in some cases fifteen-day) initial 
waiting period). Second requests totaled 50, 45, 63, 41, 31, and 46 
respectively between 2005 and 2010. Based on their investigations, 
the agencies decided to challenge a subset of these proposed mergers. 
Of this very small set of cases, Moffitt examines only the subset of 
fully litigated preliminary injunction cases. As a result, her data do 
not account for consent decrees (where efficiencies may mitigate the 
extent of the remedies), nor do they account for situations where a 
second request was issued but no enforcement was obtained, where 
the parties abandoned deals after the second request (where it is clear 
that efficiencies did not prevail), or where the case is decided after a 
full trial on the merits. 
The data above suggest that the shadow of the law regarding 
merger efficiencies is not the handful of litigated preliminary 
injunction merger cases. Rather, it is the day-to-day practice of 
antitrust law that does not necessarily involve litigated preliminary 
injunctions. Discussions regarding efficiencies happen at a number of 
levels. First, there are discussions between the outside counsel who 
 
 9. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2000-2009 
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.html#N_5. 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2011). 
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file the HSR premerger notification form and the agency staff, and if 
second requests are issued, there are responses to specific second 
request specifications regarding efficiencies claims. During this time 
period in a government merger investigation, counsel attempt to 
convince the agency staff not to oppose the merger for a variety of 
case-specific reasons, including efficiencies claims made by the 
acquiring party. Should issues develop, the discussions that occur 
between the outside lawyers and the agency staff and management 
take on greater importance, as do staff discussions with the buyer’s 
businesspeople and discussions between economists and lawyers. 
These different negotiations make up the bulk of the practice of 
efficiency discussions and better represent the reality of efficiencies 
practice at the agencies.11 
Few academic works analyze the overall merger control process 
and the various negotiations that occur.12 However, one work by 
Malcolm B. Coate and Andrew J. Heimert (which Moffitt does not cite) 
specifically covers merger efficiencies and provides a nuanced view of 
the FTC decisionmaking process.13 This important work reviewed the 
confidential files of the FTC staff to determine how the FTC staff 
treated claims of efficiencies in the ten years after the 1997 inclusion 
of efficiencies in the Merger Guidelines. During that ten-year period, 
the FTC staff conducted 186 second request investigations into 
proposed mergers. Coate and Heimert found that while staff 
considered efficiency arguments, they “did not take a conclusive 
position on the majority of efficiencies claims discussed in the studied 
memoranda.”14 The Coate and Heimert study also revealed that in a 
significant minority of merger cases (39 of 186), neither the lawyers 
(Bureau of Competition) nor the economists (Bureau of Economics) at 
the FTC addressed any efficiencies claims. However, in the majority of 
the mergers investigated (147 of 186), the staff did consider efficiency 
claims. Coate and Heimert’s study details the amount of pages spent 
on efficiencies claims in staff recommendation memoranda from the 
agency lawyers and economists, the particular types of efficiency 
claims made, the number of claims brought up in each matter, and the 
 
 11. To be sure, it is difficult to obtain data from non-public investigations regarding non-
challenged mergers. 
 12. One such work incorporating both quantitative and qualitative practitioner survey data 
is D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055 
(2010). 
 13. MALCOLM B. COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, MERGER EFFICIENCIES AT THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION 1997–2007, (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902 
mergerefficiencies.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 1. 
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number of claims that staff rejected. In doing so, their study provides 
a broader glimpse of the reality of the use of efficiencies in antitrust 
practice than does Moffitt’s small sample of decided preliminary 
injunction merger cases. Because agency review shapes the nature of 
filed cases that might emerge in the pipeline, any analysis of 
efficiencies that omits a discussion of the earlier stage of negotiation 
will lead to mistaken inferences. 
Within her small pool of preliminary injunction merger cases, 
efficiencies are rarely, if ever, the key issue on which courts decide a 
case.15 Instead, preliminary injunction cases typically focus on 
primary issues such as defining the relevant product market even if 
the opinions analyze efficiencies claims.16 
Moffitt, however, limited her research and conclusions to 
preliminary injunction matters that analyzed efficiencies during the 
1986 to 2009 time period.17 In doing so, she ignored the other litigated 
merger cases and, most importantly, all other merger enforcement 
actions during the same time period. In addition, ten of the twenty-
three preliminary injunction cases listed on page 1711 of Moffitt’s 
article were decided prior to the 1997 Revisions and the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines and thus are not representative of the agencies’ current 
enforcement practices regarding efficiencies analysis.18 
An analysis of efficiencies that is limited to litigated 
preliminary injunction cases provides a skewed analysis of the 
importance of the issue to the enforcement agencies analyzing 
potential competitive effects in a specific merger matter. Because so 
few merger cases are litigated, it is critical to understand how the 
agencies internally analyze efficiencies. Former FTC Commissioner 
Thomas Leary highlighted this point in a 2002 American Bar 
Association speech, where he stated: “Since very few merger cases are 
actually litigated and since (with the exception of hospital mergers) 
the prosecutors tend to prevail in court, the internal treatment of 
 
 15. The efficiencies defense is not always raised by the merging parties in preliminary 
injunction matters or analyzed by courts. See generally, e.g., United States v. UPM-Kymmene 
Oyj, No. 03-C-2528, 2003 WL 21781902 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2003) (failing to discuss efficiencies in 
the decision issuing a preliminary injunction); United States v. Sungard Data Sys., 172 F. Supp. 
2d 172 (D.D.C. 2001) (failing to discuss efficiencies in the decision denying a preliminary 
injunction).  
 16. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008); FTC v. 
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).  
 17. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1747–54. 
 18. Id. at 1711. Section III, infra, discusses how the efficiencies section in the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines did not substantially change the efficiencies section in the 1997 Revisions.  
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merger efficiencies by the agencies is of critical importance.”19 The 
then-FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky also noted in a 1998 speech that 
although the 1997 Revisions to the efficiencies analysis may not 
impact litigated merger decisions, they “will make a difference . . . in 
connection with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”20 In fact, the 
efficiencies section of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, which is discussed 
infra, describes how the agencies evaluate efficiencies.21 The agencies’ 
Commentary, which is also discussed infra, provides the most 
comprehensive summary of how the agencies apply efficiencies 
analysis to actual merger cases.22 
II. THERE IS MORE NUANCE TO THE MERGER GUIDELINES 
We note that there is an important institutional issue at play 
for efficiencies, and the Merger Guidelines more explicitly, because the 
Supreme Court has not heard a merger case for many years.23 Thus, it 
is unclear whether the Court would apply the existing set of Merger 
Guidelines at any given time in a Clayton Act Section 7 case. Professor 
Hillary Greene provides some guidance in her explanation that courts 
have gradually shifted their thinking to follow more closely the 
language in the Merger Guidelines (at least for the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines).24 But this process has been gradual, as the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines did not reflect the case law of the time.25 The 1992 Merger 
Guidelines were aspirational (in the sense that the Merger Guidelines 
described how the agencies would analyze mergers) rather than a 
restatement of merger law.26  
 
 19. Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of 
Ongoing Evolution, Remarks at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2002 Fall Forum (Nov. 8, 
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/efficienciesandantitrust.shtm.  
 20. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 485, 485 (1999) (reprinting his entire speech).  
 21. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 10. 
 22. See Commentary, supra note 3, ch. 4.  
 23. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (discussing competitive 
effects analysis in a merger). 
 24. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in 
Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 774 (2006). For more information on how this 
process also has occurred in the area of efficiencies, see William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, 
The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal 
Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 232 (2003) (“The courts have largely adopted the analytical 
framework for evaluating efficiency claims that is set out in the Guidelines.”). 
 25. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in 
Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 774 (2006). 
 26. Id. 
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As a result of a gradual process, courts harmonized their 
decisions with the 1992 Merger Guidelines.27 Yet, another problem 
appeared as courts moved closer to the language of the Merger 
Guidelines. During this same period of a shift in the decided cases, the 
agencies themselves began to shift their own internal application of 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines, which eventually led to the adoption of 
the 2010 Merger Guidelines.28 As a result of this lagged 
interpretation, the analyses set forth in some judicial opinions is 
different from the theories used by the agencies when they review 
merger filings via the HSR process in Section 7A of the Clayton Act. 
This contrast between how agencies interpreted the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines and the 1997 Revisions prior to the adoption of the 2010 
Merger Guidelines and how the courts applied them suggests that for 
those cases that the agencies challenged, courts’ application of the 
1992 Merger Guidelines and the 1997 Revisions in some cases differed 
from agency determinations of mergers that the agencies did not 
challenge.  
Specific to the area of efficiencies under the Merger Guidelines, 
the courts generally only saw preliminary injunction cases where the 
likelihood of harm, as alleged by the agencies, was quite certain (e.g., 
merger to monopoly and near-monopoly). As such, the courts in 
preliminary injunction cases did not have the opportunity to analyze 
efficiencies in moderately concentrated market cases (those cases for 
which the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) was between 1,000 
and 1,800) and cases in the lower range of highly concentrated cases 
(HHI of 1,800 to approximately 2,500 or 3,000) to provide a better 
sense of how efficiencies could overcome alleged anticompetitive 
effects. So-called “close cases” where efficiency claims may have been 
accepted by the courts did not get litigated.  
 
 27. Id. 
 28. In a scathing attack on the guidelines at a 2004 FTC/DOJ Merger Enforcement 
Workshop, practitioner William Blumenthal, who would become general counsel of the FTC 
within a year, stated:  
Basically, to draw from the parlance of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, the 
1992 Guidelines are deceptive. They may be literally accurate, and their meaning may 
have been properly understood at the time they were issued, but their meaning is 
misinterpreted today by a material percentage of readers. I ignore them as an 
operational tool, and I urge associates and clients to do likewise, except perhaps as 
background reading. If the uninitiated try to apply the Guidelines without detailed 
annotations explaining terms of art, they are likely to reach an erroneous conclusion.  
William Blumenthal, Why Bother?: On Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/docs/202600.htm. The hearings took place 
in February 2004. By March 2005, Blumenthal started as General Counsel of the FTC. Thus, one 
can conclude that his comments rang true enough that it did not hurt his chances for the top 
lawyer job at the agency.  
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What the Merger Guidelines and Commentary provide is both 
clarification and change for efficiencies. Each set of new Merger 
Guidelines issued by the agencies includes both changes and 
clarifications to the methodology for determining whether a merger 
may be anticompetitive and in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. For example, the introduction in the 1992 Merger Guidelines of 
unilateral effects and the concept that entry must be “timely, likely, 
and sufficient to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern” 
reflect change.29 Similarly, the concept of “upward pricing pressure” in 
Section 6.1 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines reflect change. At the same 
time, the concept in Section 2.2.2 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines that 
information from customers may be highly relevant reflects 
clarification on existing analysis. These examples illustrate the dual 
purpose of the Merger Guidelines. The interaction of the themes of 
clarification and change has shaped how antitrust practitioners 
respond to the agencies in making efficiency arguments. 
III. A MORE SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION OF THE 1997 REVISIONS AND 
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES FACILITATES A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF 
EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER ANALYSIS AT THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES  
On August 19, 2010, the DOJ and FTC issued the new 2010 
Merger Guidelines, replacing the 1992 Merger Guidelines and their 
1997 revised section on efficiencies.30 We presume that Moffitt did not 
have enough time to incorporate significant discussion of the changes 
from the 2010 Merger Guidelines into her article. However, we think 
it is important to include a discussion of them at this point because 
the new developments allow us to update the analysis of merger 
efficiencies. The 2010 Merger Guidelines attempt to provide clarity to 
the federal antitrust agencies’ analysis of mergers. The purpose of the 
2010 Merger Guidelines is to “assist the business community and 
antitrust practitioners by increasing the transparency of the 
analytical process underlying the Agencies’ enforcement decisions.”31 
Although the 2010 Merger Guidelines and its predecessors are not 
law, “[t]hey may also assist the courts in developing an appropriate 
 
 29. Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty 
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 53–54 (2010). Carl Shapiro is the Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General for Economics in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and one of the 
primary drafters of the 2010 Merger Guidelines. 
 30. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, at 1 n.1.  
 31. Id. at 1. 
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framework for interpreting and applying the antitrust laws in the 
horizontal merger context.”32 
Section 10 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines is the new efficiencies 
section and is the direct replacement to Section 4 of the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, as revised in 1997. Moffitt’s substantive analysis of the 
new efficiencies section is limited to a statement in a footnote that 
“the Efficiencies section of the 2010 Revisions is not substantively 
different from the Efficiencies section of the 1997 Revisions.”33 Moffitt 
also states in the same footnote that “because the courts have not yet 
heard a case since the release of the 2010 Revisions, this Article does 
not analyze the latest revision.”34 
Moffitt is correct in stating that Section 10 of the efficiencies 
section in the 2010 Merger Guidelines “is not substantively different 
from” Section 4 in the 1997 Revisions.35 The DOJ and the FTC did, 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1700 n.6. Moffitt also cites the 2010 Merger Guidelines in 
footnotes 46, 93, and 105, but she does not discuss the new guidelines in the text. In fairness, 
Moffitt makes clear in footnote 105 that her article was drafted prior to the release of the 2010 
Merger Guidelines. 
 34. Id. At this time, only two cases from a federal district court or federal appellate court 
cite to the 2010 Merger Guidelines. See FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., Case No. 3:11 CV 
47, slip op. (N.D. Ohio March 29, 2011); FTC v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. SACV 10-1873 AG 
(MLGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20354, at *35 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011). Paragraph 166 of the 
LabCorp preliminary injunction case cites to Section 10 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines. 
Paragraph 26 of the Conclusions of Law in the ProMedica preliminary injunction case cites to 
Section 10 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines for the statement that the defendant “failed in its 
burden of proving that its asserted efficiencies are: (1) verifiable; (2) not attributable to reduced 
output or quality; (3) merger-specific; and (4) sufficient to outweigh the transaction’s 
anticompetitive effects.” The ProMedica decision also states that “[e]fficiencies must be 
‘extraordinary’ to overcome high concentration levels” and that “[n]o court in [an FTC Act] 13(b) 
proceeding, or otherwise, has found efficiencies sufficient to rescue an otherwise illegal merger.”  
Id. ¶¶ 27–28. The FTC also cites to the 2010 Merger Guidelines in Polypore International, Inc., 
2010-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 77,267 (Dec. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9327/101213polyporeopinion.pdf. Polypore is the first FTC 
administrative decision citing to the 2010 Merger Guidelines. The FTC’s Polypore decision only 
briefly discusses issues relating to efficiencies, in part because the “[r]espondent has not raised 
these arguments in its appeal briefs.” Id. at 32 n.45. Efficiencies were raised by Polypore at the 
administrative trial and rejected by the administrative law judge. Polypore Int’l, Inc., 2010 
F.T.C. LEXIS 17 1, 293–95 (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/os/adjpro/d9327/100305polyporeincdecision.pdf. 
 35. See Gary Zanfagna, Pandora’s Box Opened: The New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 10 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2010, at 1, 3, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/10/10/Oct10-Zanfagna10-21f.pdf (noting that Section 10 “is largely unchanged from the 
1992 Guidelines, as amended in 1997”). The relatively small change in the efficiencies section of 
the 2010 Merger Guidelines is not surprising. On September 22, 2009, at the time the DOJ and 
FTC announced a series of public workshops to obtain input into updating the Merger 
Guidelines, the agencies stated that they did not “plan on altering the fundamental approach to 
efficiencies.” FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: 
QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg 
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however, enhance the section and broaden efficiencies analysis by 
adding new language that “recognize[s] and account[s] for the 
possibility that a merger may generate innovation efficiencies.”36 
Moreover, although Section 10 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines may not 
be “substantively different” from Section 4 of the 1997 Revisions from 
an analytical framework, the likelihood that the agencies will accord 
more weight to efficiencies claims in mergers with a post-acquisition 
HHI between 1,801 and 2,500 appears significantly greater since 
these mergers are no longer “presumed to be likely to enhance market 
power” (assuming an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points) in 
a highly concentrated market and instead only “potentially raise 
significant competitive concerns” in a moderately concentrated market 
(assuming an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points).37 
Moffitt also did not sufficiently discuss the importance of the 
key components in the 1997 Revisions to the efficiencies section and 
how the analysis of efficiencies is tied directly into the competitive 
effects analysis for the first time.38 The key components of the 1997 
Revisions include merger-specific efficiencies, cognizable efficiencies, 
verification of efficiencies claims, sufficiency of efficiencies, out of 
market efficiencies, and fixed cost savings. 39 These key components of 
the efficiencies section, which at the time were intended to provide 
clarity to the business community and practitioners, remain largely 
unchanged in the 2010 Merger Guidelines.  
Both the 1997 Revisions and the 2010 Merger Guidelines 
include near-identical language, stating that a primary benefit of 
 
/hmg-questions.pdf. Nevertheless, the agencies did request comments on the existing efficiencies 
section. Question 14 on the DOJ/FTC questionnaire asked the following:  
The Guidelines ask (§4) whether cognizable efficiencies are sufficient to reverse the 
merger’s potential to raise price. In making this determination, the Guidelines 
distinguish between fixed and marginal costs, with savings in marginal costs more 
likely to influence price. Should the Guidelines be updated to state that any 
cognizable cost reductions are relevant to the extent that they are likely to generate 
benefits for customers in the foreseeable future? Who should bear the burden of 
making this showing?  
 36. Shapiro, supra note 29, at 85. See also James Langenfeld, 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: Changes in Policy, Transparency, & Predictability, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, 
Oct. 2010, Vol. 2, at 1, 13, 15 (discussing innovation and the efficiencies section of the 2010 
Merger Guidelines). 
 37. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.3. 
 38. Pitofsky, supra note 20, at 486 (“The most significant aspect of the 1997 revisions is 
that they tied efficiencies directly into competitive effects analysis.”); Paul T. Denis, The Give 
and Take of the Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, 
51, 56 (“The 1997 revision to the efficiencies section of the Guidelines, for all practical purposes, 
collapsed efficiencies analysis into competitive effects analysis.”). 
 39. It is important to note that efficiencies claims can be speculative and are often difficult 
to prove. 
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mergers to the economy is “their potential to generate significant 
efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive 
to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, 
enhanced service, or new products” and that “merger-generated 
efficiencies may enhance competition by permitting two ineffective 
competitors to form a more effective competitor, e.g., by combining 
complementary assets.”40 They also state: 
In a unilateral effects context, incremental cost reductions may reduce or reverse any 
increases in the merged firm’s incentive to elevate price. Efficiencies also may lead to 
new or improved products, even if they do not immediately and directly affect price.41 
In a coordinated effects context, incremental cost reductions may make coordination less 
likely or effective by enhancing the incentive of a maverick to lower price or by creating 
a new maverick firm.42 
The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and 
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant 
market.43 
When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies consider the ability 
of the merged firm to conduct research or development more effectively.44 
In addition to the key components for evaluating efficiencies, 
both the 1997 Revisions and the recent 2010 Merger Guidelines apply 
a sliding scale approach, rather than what Moffitt described as a 
“balancing approach,” for weighing efficiencies benefits against the 
 
 40. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 10. Moffitt does cite to the 1997 Revisions for 
her statement that “recent Agency actions and guidelines explicitly recognize the potential 
positive, pro-competitive impact of merger-generated efficiencies.” Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1705.  
 41. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 10. 
 42. Id. at § 10. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 31. The agencies’ analysis of efficiency claims will likely soon be analyzed at an 
earlier stage in the review process. On August 13, 2010, six days before the DOJ and FTC issued 
their new Merger Guidelines, the FTC proposed revisions to the HSR premerger notification 
rules. See FTC Press Release, “Commission Proposes Changes to Improve Premerger Notification 
Form,” (Aug. 13, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/hsrcarilion.shtm. The 
proposed revisions include “the addition of Item 4(d), which would require filing parties to 
submit certain documents useful to the Agencies’ substantive review of transactions . . .” 75 Fed. 
Reg. 57110, 57111 (Sept. 17, 2010). The FTC’s proposed Item 4(d)(iii) would require the filing 
parties to submit all “studies, surveys, analyses and reports evaluating or analyzing such 
synergies and/or efficiencies if they were prepared by or for any officer(s) or director(s) (or, in the 
case of unincorporated entities, individuals exercising similar functions) for the purpose of 
evaluating or analyzing the acquisition. Financial models without stated assumptions need not 
be provided in response to this item.” Id. at 57116. New Item 4(d)(iii) will likely require the 
merging parties and the agency staff to analyze efficiencies claims at the time the proposed 
merger filing is submitted to the agencies rather than at a later time. At this time, the FTC’s 
proposed changes to the HSR premerger form have not been adopted. 
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potential harm to consumers.45 Section 10 of the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines specifically describes the sliding scale approach: 
In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply compare the magnitude of the 
cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the 
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater 
must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to 
consumers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When the potential adverse competitive 
effect of a merger is likely to be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great 
cognizable efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from being 
anticompetitive. . . . 
In the Agencies’ experience efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in merger 
analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not 
great. Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.46 
Likewise, Section 4 of the 1997 Revisions describes a sliding 
scale approach in almost identical language: 
In conducting this analysis [footnote omitted] the Agency will not simply compare the 
magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely harm to 
competition absent the efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive effect 
of a merger—as indicated by the increase in the HHI and post-merger HHI from Section 
1, the analysis of potential competitive effects from Section 2, and the timeliness, 
likelihood, and sufficiency of entry from Section 3—the greater must be cognizable 
efficiencies in order for the Agency to conclude that the merger will not have an 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When the potential adverse competitive 
effect of a merger is likely to be particularly large, extraordinarily great cognizable 
efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive. 
In the Agency’s experience, efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in merger 
analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not 
great. Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.47 
 
 45. Pitofsky, supra note 20, at 486 (“The revisions expressly incorporated a sliding-scale 
approach into efficiency analysis.”). See also David Scheffman, Efficiencies/Dynamic 
Analysis/Integrated Analysis Panel, FTC/DOJ Merger Enforcement Workshop 12, 21, 100 (Feb. 
19, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/040219ftctrans.pdf (discussing the 
sliding scale analysis for evaluating efficiency claims); COMMENTS OF THE AM. ANTITRUST INST. 
11 (2009) (responding to FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 35) (“a sliding 
scale is already explicit in the treatment of efficiencies” in Section 4 of the 1997 Revisions to the 
Merger Guidelines), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/ 
545095-00023.pdf; ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 249 (3d. ed. 
2008) (“the Merger Guidelines, as revised, expressly incorporate a sliding scale approach”). 
Moffitt mistakenly refers to “a balancing approach” rather than a sliding scale approach, even 
though she specifically cites in footnote 44 to the language in Section 4 of the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, as revised in 1997, stating that efficiencies are most likely to impact merger analysis 
“when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great. Efficiencies 
almost never justify a merger to a monopoly or near-monopoly.” Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1707 
n.44, 1708. 
 46. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 10. 
 47. 1997 Revisions, supra note 2, § 4. The Commentary indirectly suggest a sliding scale 
approach, stating: 
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The statement in Section 10 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines 
that “the Agencies will not simply compare the magnitude of the 
cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely harm to 
competition absent the efficiencies” strongly suggests that a dollar-for-
dollar balancing of the potential for harm versus the potential 
efficiencies is inappropriate where there is at least some likelihood of 
potential harm to consumers. This is particularly evident in the next 
two sentences in the section, stating:  
The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be the 
cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to customers, for the 
Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect in the 
relevant market. When the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to 
be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies would be 
necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive.48 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines justify the sliding scale approach by 
stating: “In adhering to this approach, the Agencies are mindful that 
the antitrust laws give competition, not internal operational efficiency, 
primacy in protecting customers.”49 
Figure 1 below attempts to illustrate the difference between a 
balancing approach and the sliding scale approach in the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines and the predecessor 1997 Revisions. The solid line shows a 
dollar-for-dollar balancing approach between the magnitude of harm 
and the magnitude of efficiencies. The dashed line, which is solely for 
illustrative purposes, attempts to show the sliding scale approach 
where the magnitude of efficiencies must increase by an even greater 
rate than the magnitude of harm as the potential adverse competitive 
effects from a merger increase.  
Under the balancing approach, estimated efficiencies above the 
solid line (Zone 1 and Zone 2) are greater than the likely magnitude of 
harm and are sufficient to justify the merger. Estimated efficiencies 
below the solid line (Zone 3) are less than the estimated magnitude of 
harm and are insufficient to justify the merger.  Under the sliding 
scale approach, estimated efficiencies above the dashed line (Zone 1) 
are sufficiently greater than the likely magnitude of harm to justify 
the merger. Estimated efficiencies below the dashed line (Zone 2 and 
Zone 3) are insufficient to justify the merger. The area in Zone 2 
 
Within the integrated analysis framework for evaluating competitive effects, 
“efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in merger analysis when the likely 
adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great.” Efficiencies are a 
significant factor in the Agencies’ decisions not to challenge some mergers that 
otherwise are likely to have, at most, only slight anticompetitive effects. 
Commentary, supra note 3, ch. 4 at 55. 
 48. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 10. 
 49. Id. 
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between the dashed line and the solid line shows the difference 
between the balancing approach and the sliding scale in evaluating 
whether the estimated efficiencies are sufficient to justify a merger. 
The exact boundary between Zone 1 and Zone 2 is not clear from the 
Merger Guidelines, but Figure 1 illustrates the general principle that 
the magnitude of efficiencies and harm are not balanced one for one 
under the sliding scale approach.50 All that is clear from the Merger 
Guidelines is that the gap between the magnitude of efficiencies and 





 50. Herbert Hovenkamp provides a recommendation for quantifying the sliding scale 
approach. 4A PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 976d, at 107 (3d ed. 
2009). For a “moderately threatening merger,” a “showing of ‘significant’ efficiencies” is required. 
Id. Professor Hovenkamp defines a moderately threatening merger as “one in which the merger 
meets the minimum thresholds for prima facie illegality but fails to create a dominant firm, or 
where the post-merger HHI is not significantly above 100.” Id. (internal citations omitted). For 
these types of mergers, “the proven efficiencies should be the equivalent of a 4 or 5 percent cost 
reduction across the entire output of the merging firm in the market in which the merger is 
challenged.” Id. (internal citations omitted). For “a merger presenting a strong competitive 
threat,” a “showing of ‘extraordinary’ efficiencies” is required. Professor Hovenkamp defines a 
merger presenting a strong competitive threat as one “where the merger creates a monopolist or 
dominant firm or the post-merger market’s HHI is well above 1800 and the HHI increase is well 
above 100.” Id. For these types of mergers, the “provable efficiencies must be at least 8 percent 
across the entire output in the market where competition is believed to be threatened; further, 
the defendants must show that the merger is unlikely to result in higher consumer prices.” Id. As 
David Balto notes in his article, the Hovenkamp “treatise fails to provide any basis for these 
thresholds.” David Balto, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation?, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, 74, at 78 (referring to an earlier edition of the same volume from the 
treatise). 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Balancing Approach to Sliding Scale 
Approach in Evaluating the Importance of Efficiencies 
 
 
What has not been discussed at length in the literature, agency 
speeches and policy statements, the Commentary, the Merger 
Guidelines, or case law is a detailed analysis of the application of the 
sliding scale approach (as opposed to what Moffitt describes as a 
balancing approach). The statement in Section 10 of the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines, like the similar statement in Section 4 of the 1997 
Revisions, referring to “[t]he greater the potential adverse competitive 
effect,” only vaguely defines how to appropriately measure the 
potential adverse effect. For example, other than measuring the 
probability of harm based on a “merger to monopoly or near-
monopoly,” there is no further discussion whether to evaluate the 
probability of the harm regardless of its absolute magnitude, the 
absolute magnitude of the potential harm regardless of the level of 
probability (assuming at least a highly concentrated market), or some 
combination of the certainty of harm and its potential magnitude. At 
one level, if the probability of harm is quite high, the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines state that efficiencies will rarely overcome the likelihood of 
adverse effects (e.g., “[e]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to 
monopoly or near-monopoly”). At another level, if the magnitude of 
potential harm is substantial (e.g., “[w]hen the potential adverse 
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competitive effect of a merger is likely to be particularly substantial”), 
then the 2010 Merger Guidelines state that “extraordinarily great 
cognizable efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from 
being anticompetitive.” Both the 2010 Merger Guidelines and the 1997 
Revisions, however, are unclear in articulating how the agencies will 
apply a sliding scale analysis if the potential magnitude of likely harm 
is “particularly substantial” but the probability of harm is less than 
what is likely under a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly (e.g., a 5 
to 4 or 4 to 3 merger where the potential magnitude of harm is 
“particularly substantial”).  
Figure 2 below attempts to apply the sliding scale language in 
Section 10 of the 2010 Merger Guidelines to mergers with either a 
high or low probability of harm and either a high or low magnitude of 
harm.51 As the figure shows in Quadrants I and IV, as long as the 
probability of harm is high (defined as “merger to monopoly or near-
monopoly”), efficiencies almost never justify a merger regardless of the 
magnitude of the harm. As the figure shows in Quadrant III, there is 
no similar discussion in Section 10 regarding how to apply the sliding 
scale approach if the magnitude for potential harm is high (e.g., based 
on the amount of commerce subject to a price increase) but the 
probability of harm is lower—at least lower than the probability of 





 51. The reference to low probability of harm in Figure 2 is intended to mean low relative to 
the probability of harm accorded to a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly. Low probability of 
harm is not intended to refer to low probability of harm in an absolute sense (e.g., a merger in an 
unconcentrated or moderately concentrated market as defined in the 2010 Merger Guidelines). 
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Figure 2. Application of the Sliding Scale Approach to Efficiencies 
Analysis in the 2010 Merger Guidelines52 
   
 
The following examples illustrate the dichotomy in applying a 
sliding scale approach to mergers where the magnitude for potential 
harm is high but the probability of harm is lower than the probability 
of harm in a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly (Quadrant III) 
compared to a merger where the magnitude for potential harm is low 
(or at least relatively low) but the probability of harm is high 
(Quadrant I).  
Example A is illustrative of mergers that fall in Quadrant III. 
Assume there are five retailers of equal size and two propose merging 
(a 5 to 4 merger). Assume further that there is a well-defined product 
and geographic market with three remaining competitors and new 
entry is difficult and would not be timely, likely, and sufficient to deter 
or prevent the potential competitive effects. The total annual sales in 
the market are $1 billion.53 In this example, the acquiring firm would 
have a forty percent post-acquisition share, the post-acquisition HHI 
would be 2,800 (highly concentrated market), and the increase in 
concentration would be 800 (“presumed likely to enhance market 
 
 52. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 10. 
 53. This example is representative of five supermarket firms, each operating ten 
supermarkets in the same metropolitan area, with each store’s weekly sales averaging 
approximately $385,000. 
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power”). A modest one percent price increase results in a potential 
magnitude of consumer harm of $10 million per year.54  
Example B is illustrative of mergers that fall in Quadrant I. 
Assume there are three manufacturers of equal size and two propose 
merging (a 3 to 2 merger). Assume that there is a well-defined product 
and geographic market with one remaining competitor and new entry 
is difficult and would not be timely, likely, and sufficient to deter or 
prevent the potential competitive effects. The total annual sales in the 
market are $100 million. In this example, the acquiring firm would 
have a sixty-seven percent post-acquisition share, the post-acquisition 
HHI would be 5,556 (highly concentrated market), and the increase in 
concentration would be 2,222 (“presumed likely to enhance market 
power”). A five percent price increase results in a potential magnitude 
of consumer harm of $5 million per year, one-half the potential 
magnitude of harm in example A, although the probability of harm is 
greater than the probability of harm in example A.55 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines and the 1997 Revisions are clear 
in stating that “[e]fficiencies almost never justify” the merger in 
example B since it is a merger to near-monopoly. The 2010 Merger 
Guidelines and the 1997 Revisions are less clear in applying the 
sliding scale approach to example A, where the magnitude of harm is 
twice the magnitude of harm in example B but the probability of harm 
is less. This ambiguity exists even though Section 10 states that 
“[w]hen the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to 
be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable 
efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from being 
anticompetitive” because there is no corresponding assignment of the 
 
 54. To further illustrate the dichotomy in applying a sliding scale approach, if example A 
were changed from five firms to six firms, of which two are merging, the acquiring firm would 
have a thirty-three percent post-acquisition share, the post-acquisition HHI would be 2,222 
(moderately concentrated market), and the increase in concentration would be 556 (“potentially 
raise[s] significant competitive concerns and often warrant[s] scrutiny”). The probability of 
potential harm in this alternative example is less than the probability of potential harm in 
example A, particularly since the additional competitor changes the market from highly 
concentrated to moderately concentrated, but the magnitude of potential harm remains the 
same. 
 55. The analysis does not materially change if we compare the expected values of the effects 
between example A and example B. In example A, if we assume only a fifty percent probability of 
a one percent market wide price increase by retailers since this is a 5 to 4 merger, the expected 
value of the magnitude of harm is $5 million per year. In example B, if we assume an eighty 
percent probability of a five percent price increase by manufacturers since this is a 3 to 2 merger, 
the expected value of the magnitude of harm is $4 million, which is still lower than the expected 
magnitude of harm in example A. The one percent price increase is typically used as a 
measurement of likely consumer harm in retail mergers with low margins, whereas the larger 
five percent price increase is a better measurement of likely consumer harm for manufactured 
goods with higher margins. 
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probability of harm. What remains unclear under the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines and its predecessor is exactly where the sliding scale curve 
bends and by how much for mergers that are not mergers to monopoly 
or near-monopoly but otherwise have a potentially high magnitude of 
harm with a relatively lower probability of the harm occurring. 
IV. SLIDING SCALE VERSUS THE BALANCING APPROACH FOR 
ANALYZING EFFICIENCIES CLAIMS IN LITIGATED MERGER CASES 
Case law also recognizes a sliding scale approach rather than a 
balancing approach in analyzing efficiencies where the likelihood of 
consumer harm is high. For example, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co. cited to Section 4 
of the 1992 Merger Guidelines, as revised in 1997, in stating that “the 
high market concentration levels in this case require, in rebuttal, 
proof of extraordinary efficiencies, which the appellees failed to 
supply.”56 The Heinz opinion also states that “given the high 
concentration levels, the court must undertake a rigorous analysis of 
the kinds of efficiencies being urged by the parties in order to ensure 
that those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than mere speculation and 
promises about post-merger behavior.”57 Had Moffitt analyzed the 
litigated cases cited in her article using the Guidelines’ sliding scale 
approach for evaluating efficiencies,58 she may not have concluded the 
courts are somehow at fault for not properly applying a balancing test, 
particularly when a balancing test is inconsistent with the Merger 
Guidelines’ analysis since the adoption of the 1997 Revisions.59 
Courts’ use of a sliding scale approach may explain why Moffitt 
found that they tend to credit efficiencies in cases with low market 
concentration levels and tend to discredit them in cases with high 
market concentration levels.60 Put differently, when the outcome is 
 
 56. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). See Balto, 
supra note 50, at 78 (“Another important question raised in the Heinz decision is if, as the D.C. 
Circuit suggests, extraordinary efficiencies are necessary in a highly concentrated market, what 
is the level of ‘extraordinary’? . . . The court is silent on what ‘extraordinary’ means.”). The 
ProMedica decision also cites to Heinz as support for the proposition that “[e]fficiencies must be 
‘extraordinary’ to overcome high concentration levels.” FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., Case 
No. 3:11 CV 47, slip op. at ¶ 27 of the Conclusions of Law (N.D. Ohio March 29, 2011). 
 57. Id. at 721. 
 58. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1698–99. 
 59. See id. Moffitt similarly states that the courts apply “no true balancing analysis.” Id. at 
1700. 
 60. Courts generally credit efficiencies in cases where they have otherwise concluded that 
the relevant market is not highly concentrated and proposed merger is not anticompetitive. See, 
e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 148–49 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(crediting efficiencies after rejecting the government’s alleged product and geographic market). 
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rather clear—that is, a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly as 
stated in the Merger Guidelines, or where both the government and 
courts are quite confident that the merger is anticompetitive—
efficiencies rarely overcome the adverse competitive effects.61 For the 
more marginal cases, by contrast, efficiencies play a much more 
significant role in the competitive effects analysis and therefore the 
outcome of the case. 
Former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky outlined the 
importance of fully understanding how the agencies internally analyze 
efficiencies, rather than simply analyzing efficiencies claims in 
litigated cases, when he stated that the litigated cases are not good 
examples for how the agencies evaluate efficiencies claims: 
Incidentally, there was a comment that courts almost never say [a merger is] illegal, but 
because of the efficiencies, I’ll make it—I’ll call it legal. I believe the reason for that is 
the agency doesn’t bring cases that are barely illegal but with substantial efficiencies. 
And therefore, the courts haven’t had a shot at this, and I’m not sure they’re going to get 
a shot very soon, because the agencies are very sensitive to claims of efficiency.62 
 
Courts generally do not credit efficiencies where they find the relevant market is highly 
concentrated and the proposed merger is likely anticompetitive. See, e.g., H.J. Heinz Co., 246 
F.3d at 720–21; FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 61–63 (D.D.C. 1998); FTC v. 
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088–90 (D.D.C. 1997); see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION 
COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 73 n.58 (2007) (citing to a Statement by George S. 
Cary that “the courts have done quite well in evaluating efficiency arguments in litigation”), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/chapter1.pdf. 
 61. Roundtable Discussion, Advice for the New Administration, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, 
at 8, 17. Former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky stated: “I had a good deal to do with inserting an 
efficiency defense in the Merger Guidelines. But it never occurred to me that 75 percent [market 
share] mergers [such as the Maytag/Whirlpool merger approved by the Department of Justice in 
2006] can be justified with efficiency claims. Efficiency claims seemed to me to be a tie-breaker 
for much smaller [market share] transactions.” At the same forum, Pitofsky further stated that 
“I can’t remember too many cases where, either formally or informally, 75 percent [market 
share] mergers were cleared on grounds that there were efficiencies. That just doesn’t seem to 
me to be the idea of the efficiency defense.” Id. at 18. See also Robert Pitofsky, Efficiency 
Consideration and Merger Enforcement: Comparison of U.S. and EU Approaches, 30 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1413, 1418 (2007) (“There is no recorded instance in the United States where an 
otherwise illegal merger was found by a court not to violate the antitrust laws because of the 
presence of efficiencies.”). 
 62. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies/Dynamic Analysis/Integrated Analysis Panel, FTC/DOJ 
Merger Enforcement Workshop 82–83 (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/ 
mergerenforce/040219ftctrans.pdf (commenting on the efficiencies section of the Merger 
Guidelines); see also George S. Cary, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: From Both Sides Now, 
Testimony to the Antitrust Modernization Commission 16 (Nov. 17, 2005) (“[T]he government 
will rarely litigate cases in the absence of fairly clear evidence of a likely anticompetitive effect 
that would be difficult to overcome with efficiencies in any event.”), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Cary_final.pdf. 
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V. UTILIZING THE COMMENTARY AND AGENCY STATEMENTS TO BETTER 
UNDERSTAND EFFICIENCIES 
Moffitt’s article also missed the opportunity to discuss the 
efficiencies analysis in the Commentary, which was issued by the DOJ 
and the FTC in March 2006.63 The agencies included the analysis “to 
provide greater transparency and foster deeper understanding 
regarding antitrust law enforcement.”64 The Commentary also 
provides detailed case summaries and analysis under the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, as revised in 1997. Although the practical application of 
the efficiencies section of the recent 2010 Merger Guidelines will likely 
evolve over the next few years, the analysis and information in the 
Commentary continues to be applicable. 
Chapter 4 of the Commentary is devoted exclusively to 
analyzing efficiencies in merger matters. Although the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines replace the 1992 Merger Guidelines, as revised in 1997, the 
2010 Merger Guidelines specifically state that the 2006 Commentary 
“remains a valuable supplement to these Guidelines.”65 Moffitt’s 
omission of a detailed analysis of the cases in the efficiencies analysis 
in the Commentary further demonstrates why drawing inferences 
from a limited pool of litigated preliminary injunctions does not 
adequately reflect agency practices and issues that parties to a merger 
must consider.66  
Chapter 4 of the Commentary summarizes sixteen examples of 
the efficiencies analysis—seven FTC matters and nine DOJ matters—
of which two cases were litigated and one was settled.67 Table 2 below 
outlines the sixteen efficiencies matters in the Commentary by each 
component of efficiencies analysis. Of the sixteen examples in the 
 
 63. Commentary, supra note 3. Footnote 123 of Moffitt’s article cites to the Commentary as 
support for the statement that the agencies are attempting to increase transparency. Moffitt, 
supra note 1, at 1732 n.123. Moffitt, however, does not further discuss the efficiencies analysis in 
the Commentary in her article. 
 64. Commentary, supra note 3, at v. 
 65. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1 n.1. See also Jeffrey W. Brennan, Bridge to 
the New Merger Guidelines: The FTC-DOJ 2006 Commentary, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 15. 
 66. See Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 1418–19. Professor Pitofsky cites to the Commentary for 
his statement that although “[t]here is no recorded instance in the United States where an 
otherwise illegal merger was found by a court not to violate the antitrust laws because of the 
presence of efficiencies . . . there is increasing evidence that efficiency claims, as spelled out in 
the Guidelines, have had the effect of persuading enforcement authorities not to challenge 
proposed mergers.” Id. 
 67. The two litigated cases are United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004) and FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004). Thus, of these sixteen 
cases, Moffitt only had two in her data set. The settled case is Genzyme-Ilex. See Genzyme Corp., 
139 F.T.C. 49 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/decisions/docs/Volume139.pdf. 
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Commentary, five “were not challenged, where efficiency claims led to 
that decision, or were significant factors along with other 
considerations.”68 Six of the other case examples were credited with at 
least some efficiencies.69 
 
 
Table 2. Efficiencies Matters Analyzed in the 2006 Commentary on 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
 
Merger-Specific Efficiencies Alpha-Beta (Disguised FTC Matter); 
Nucor-Birmingham Steel (DOJ 2002)  
Cognizable Efficiencies Arch Coal-Triton (FTC 2002); 
Oracle-PeopleSoft (DOJ 2004)  
Verification of Efficiencies Claims Fine Look-Snazzy (Disguised FTC 
Matter); Genzyme-Novazyme (FTC 2004); 
A-1 Goods-Bingo (Disguised FTC Matter)  
Sufficiency of Efficiencies Toppan-DuPont (DOJ 2005);  
PayPal-eBay (DOJ 2002);  
DirectTV-Dish Network (DOJ 2002);  
Enerco-KleenBurn (Disguised FTC 
Matter) 
Out of Market Efficiencies Genzyme-Ilex (FTC 2004);  
Gai’s-United States Bakery (DOJ 1996)  
Fixed Cost Savings Verizon-MCI, SBC-AT&T (DOJ 2005);  
IMC Global-Western Ag (DOJ 1997)  
 
The Commentary provides detailed analysis on each of these 
key components of the Merger Guidelines’ efficiencies analysis and 
how they were applied to specific matters.70 This analysis is intended 
to provide antitrust lawyers and the business community “with [a] 
useful and beneficial . . . explanation of how Agencies apply the 
Guidelines in particular investigations.”71 
 
 68. See Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 1419. The five examples of cases in the Commentary that 
were not challenged based on efficiencies claims or where efficiencies claims were a significant 
factor are the following: Nucor-Birmingham Steel (DOJ 2002); Genzyme-Novazyme (FTC 2004); 
Toppan-DuPont (DOJ 2005); and Verizon-MCI, SBC-AT&T (DOJ 2005).  
 69. The six other examples of cases that were credited with at least some efficiencies are 
the following: Fine Look-Snazzy (Disguised FTC Matter); A-1 Goods-Bingo (Disguised FTC 
Matter); PayPal-eBay (DOJ 2002); Enerco-Kleenburn (Disguised FTC Matter); Genzyme-Ilex 
(FTC 2004); and Gai’s-United States Bakery (DOJ 2005).  
 70. Commentary, supra note 3, ch. 4 at 50–59. 
 71. Commentary, supra note 3, ch. 4 at v. 
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In addition to the sixteen matters analyzed in the efficiencies 
chapter in the Commentary, then-FTC Chairman Pitofsky provided 
helpful information in a speech72 to the business community and 
practitioners on the use of efficiencies in four litigated merger 
matters—FTC v. Staples, Inc. (Staples/Office Depot),73 United States v. 
Long Island Jewish Medical Center (Long Island Jewish 
Medical/North Shore Health),74 FTC v. Tenant Healthcare Corp. (Lucy 
Lee Hospital/Doctors Regional Medical Center),75 and FTC v. Cardinal 
Health, Inc. (Cardinal/McKesson).76 Other agency officials have also 
provided valuable information regarding efficiencies analysis in 
speeches and other statements.77 To enhance transparency, the 
agencies and their senior officials also occasionally provide comments 
and analysis on matters where efficiencies played a role in the 
outcome.78 This process, in turn, enables antitrust practitioners to 
refine and focus their efficiencies analysis in a manner that may 
persuade agency officials not to challenge a specific proposed merger. 
VI. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS: THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL SUPPORT 
A. Banks’ “Too Big to Fail” Issue as an Antitrust Problem 
Moffitt discusses the financial crisis in her article as a way to 
tie her discussion on merger efficiencies to a critical policy issue of the 
 
 72. See Pitofsky, supra note 20.  
 73. 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 74. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 75. 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev’d, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 76. 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 77. See, e.g., Leary, supra note 19; Interview with Richard A. Feinstein, Dir., FTC Bureau of 
Competition, theantitrustsource (Apr. 2010) 1, 6 (Feinstein discusses the FTC’s evaluation of 
efficiencies in a proposed merger), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/feinstein/1004-
feinstein-invw.pdf; Prepared Remarks of Robert Pitofsky, “Staples and Boeing: What They Say 
About Merger Enforcement at the FTC,” Sept. 23, 1997 (discussing the FTC’s analysis of 
efficiencies in the Staples/Office Depot and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas mergers), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/STAPLESspc.shtm. 
 78. See, e.g., Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to 
Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio, 
Inc., Mar. 24, 2008 at 4 (finding that “efficiencies flowing from the transaction likely would 
undermine any such concern [with increased prices]”), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/231467.pdf; Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division Statement on the Closing of Its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of 
Maytag, Mar. 29, 2006 (“The combination of strong rival suppliers with the ability to expand 
sales significantly and large cost savings and other efficiencies that Whirlpool appears likely to 
achieve indicates that this transaction is not likely to harm consumer welfare.”), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/06_at_187.html. 
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day.79 She suggests that a lack of antitrust enforcement might be 
possible because of the lower levels of concentration due in part to 
efficiency arguments and implies that the financial institutions 
undergoing mergers made strong efficiency arguments.80 This line of 
thought is not well developed in the article. More importantly, sector 
concentration in banking seems not to have played a significant role in 
the recent financial crisis. The quality (or lack thereof) of financial 
regulation—rather than antitrust effectiveness in blocking mergers—
seems to have been the primary factor for the financial crisis.81 
Indeed, if sector concentration were an important factor in the 
financial crisis, Moffitt needs to explain why the crisis had such a 
strong impact in the U.S. banking market—which was less 
concentrated relative to other OECD countries. For example, Canada’s 
financial services sector is far more concentrated than the United 
States’. And yet, it was relatively unscathed in the financial crisis 
because of more conservative financial regulation.82 Moreover, both 
the theoretical and empirical work on banking concentration provide 
mixed results. Within the theoretical and empirical literatures, one 
strand of literature suggests that banking competition actually creates 
greater instability.83 The other strand of literature takes the opposite 
view—that greater competition in banking leads to increased financial 
stability.84 But Moffitt does not cite to any of the theoretical or 
empirical finance or industrial organization literature to support why 
the issue of “too big to fail” matters for her discussion on merger 
efficiencies. 
 
 79. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1726–27. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See OECD, COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/22/43067294.pdf; Thorsten Beck, Olivier De Jonghe, & Glenn 
Schepens, Bank Competition and Stability: Reconciling Conflicting Empirical Evidence, (2010), 
(Working Paper, Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1711165. One might add that bad decisionmaking based on misaligned incentives 
for the banks also played an important role. See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: 
Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183 (2009). 
 82. Ann Graham, Lessons from Canada: Crisis-Proofing a National Financial System, 
Working Paper, Hamline University Law School (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1693885 (describing more conservative financial regulation); cf. Anita I. Anand, Is 
Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 941, 945–46 (2010) 
(discussing the causes of Canadian banks’ success relative to American and European banks 
during the 2008 financial collapse). 
 83. See, e.g., Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. 
557 (1984); Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1183 (1990). 
 84. See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Self-Interested Bank Regulation, 83 AM. 
ECON. REV. 206 (1993); FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, 
(2009). 
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B. Alleged Antitrust Under-Enforcement Under Bush 
Moffitt reiterates the popular press’s claim that antitrust 
enforcement was lax during George W. Bush’s presidency.85 She then 
suggests that antitrust enforcement during the Bush era (2001–2009), 
which she describes as “under-enforcement,” is linked to 
understanding efficiencies in the court cases that she analyzed.86 In 
this regard, Moffitt’s analysis fails on two counts. On the narrow 
count, she misreads the underlying work that she cited on lax Bush 
enforcement. Jonathan B. Baker and Carl Shapiro’s work, on which 
she relied, found that there was no difference in FTC antitrust 
enforcement between the Bush and Clinton administrations. Baker 
and Shapiro found a difference in merger enforcement with regard 
only to the DOJ, not the FTC.87 If Baker and Shapiro are correct, then 
Moffitt’s analysis should have detected a difference in discussions on 
efficiencies in court cases brought by the different agencies. However, 
Moffitt does not contemplate that FTC and DOJ enforcement differed. 
More broadly, Moffitt ignores all of the critiques of Baker and 
Shapiro’s work. In fact, significant literature suggests that there was 
no effect on mergers during the Bush years relative to the Clinton 
years and that the attention on reduced merger enforcement is due to 
a few high profile mergers that the DOJ approved.88 
VII. RISK SHIFTING PLAYS A ROLE IN FIRMS’ EVALUATION OF  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EFFICIENCIES CLAIMS IF THE  
OUTCOME IS UNCERTAIN 
Moffitt’s article states that the “courts’ inconsistent recognition 
of efficiencies adds uncertainty to the picture” and that “[t]his 
uncertainty increases the risk associated with proceeding forward 
with the merger, thus affecting individual corporations’ decisions 
 
 85. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1724–26. 
 86. Id. at 1724. 
 87. Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in 
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 246 n.86 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Jonathan B. Baker & Carl 
Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in Horizontal Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, 
Summer 2008. 
 88. Ilene Knable Gotts & James F. Rill, Reflections on Bush Administration M&A Antitrust 
Enforcement and Beyond, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 91 (2009); Timothy J. Muris, Facts Trump 
Politics: The Complexities of Comparing Merger Enforcement over Time and Between Agencies, 
ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 37; D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions and Merger Control, 17 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1127–30 (2010). 
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regarding planned transactions.”89 Although Moffitt provides no 
empirical support, she further states that “[o]n an aggregate basis, 
corporations in concentrated markets will end up abandoning more 
deals than they otherwise would if courts were more consistent with 
their recognition of efficiency claims.”90 
To our knowledge, there is no empirical data with regard to 
risk shifting to either support or rebut Moffitt’s statement. However, 
we do note that antitrust risk-shifting provisions are typically 
included in purchase agreements to resolve perceived antitrust risk if 
there is uncertainty regarding the outcome of the transaction.91 In 
transactions between competing firms, each party attempts to 
separately analyze the antitrust risk. Sellers generally demand 
provisions that will ensure the completion of the deal (for example, 
compliance by both sides with any government second request, buyers’ 
best efforts to resolve antitrust concerns through divestiture or 
licensing agreements, reverse break-up fee, termination date, etc.). At 
the same time, buyers attempt to negotiate provisions that do not 
require divestitures or other forms of relief that could materially affect 
the value of the transaction. 
Although this Response does not analyze how parties negotiate 
deals,92 buyers and sellers have an asymmetric relationship in 
assessing antitrust risk, in part because they do not share the same 
information. For example, only buyers can properly assess potential 
efficiencies or synergies resulting from an acquisition. If a buyer is 
confident that its efficiencies claims are supportable, the buyer may be 
more willing to accept risk-shifting provisions demanded by the seller. 
If the seller is less confident that the buyer will likely achieve 
efficiencies sufficient to counter any antitrust concerns, the seller may 
be more likely to demand stronger risk-shifting from the buyer. Thus, 
risk-shifting provisions enable firms to enter into purchase 
agreements even where there is some level of uncertainty concerning 
the outcome of any efficiencies claim. 
 
 89. Moffitt, supra note 1, at 1733. 
 90. Id. at 1733. 
 91. See Robert S. Schlossberg, Negotiating the Transaction: Issues for the Antitrust 
Dealmaker, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 34; John D. Harkrider, Risk-Shifting Provisions and 
Antitrust Risk: An Empirical Examination, ANTITRUST, Fall 2005, at 52; Darren S. Tucker and 
Kevin L. Yingling, Keeping the Engagement Ring: Apportioning Antitrust Risk with Reverse 
Breakup Fees, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 70. 
 92. To our knowledge, this is a research gap in the antitrust merger literature. 
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CONCLUSION 
Merger analysis is one of the most difficult areas of antitrust for 
businesses to understand because of the complexity of applying the 
underlying law. The combination of agency interactions (how the 
agencies interact with the merging parties, their lawyers, and third 
parties), guidelines that are not always clear or followed, and a 
significant amount of merger analysis that never appears in decided 
cases (since few merger cases are litigated and these cases are not 
representative) explains the value in looking beyond the litigated 
preliminary injunction cases to understand the role of efficiencies in 
merger analysis. Such complexities also create somewhat significant 
limitations to merger empirical work. Because of the nuances involved 
in merger work, antitrust empirical work should note the limitations 
of the assumptions (and indeed, have correct assumptions) and be 
modest in its inferences. 
